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The goal of this project was to find out if it is possible to select a set of metrics available
from networking equipment which could be used to detect known physical layer attacks
on Ethernet networks.
The project was carried out in a laboratory environment on a testing topology which was
designed specifically for the testing purposes of this project.
Known physical layer attacks on Ethernet networks were described in detail. A set of
metrics which might be used for attack detection was suggested. All metric values were
gathered on each link in a topology in a normal state and under each of the attacks. Ef-
fectiveness of the suggested metrics was analysed.
The project showed that it is possible to use metrics obtained from networking devices to
detect known physical layer attacks on Ethernet networks.
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11 Introduction
Nowadays security issues are becoming more and more important. The amount of sen-
sitive data transfered over networks is growing every day. More people get affected by
major breaches [1,5]. Backups with private photos are getting stolen [1,64]. Governments
spy on one another and on their own citizens [2,3]. In this situation it is important to be
aware of the weaknesses in the technologies that are used every day.
What are the consequences of someone inserting a tiny box between an unsuspecting
user and the Internet and this box saves a copy of all traffic passing by, including photos,
messages and other sensitive information? Or someone putting one of these boxes be-
fore a network-enabled printer/scanner and getting a copy of every scanned and printed
document. Unfortunately, it is not a fantasy and such devices exist. It is easy to buy one,
or build it [3]. What is worse: no antivirus or firewall on the end device can detect such
attacks. During these attacks system settings are not changed, network settings are not
changed, and visible network traffic is not changed.
This project aims to research known attacks on the networks and find ways to detect
them. More specifically, physical layer attacks on the Ethernet networks are covered.
The focus is on Ethernet networks, due to the fact that Ethernet is the most widely used
network standard nowadays [4,6]. Physical layer attacks are selected because they are
the hardest to detect. Unlike other network attacks they can function without introducing,
or modifying any network traffic.
The main feature of this research is that no specific networking equipment is used to
detect attacks. The idea is to try to detect attacks using only features, built in in a common
networking equipment, such as switches, computers and access points. In this way the
results of this research may be adopted by anyone and integrated into existing networks
without having to add any devices to their existing infrastructure.
Different network equipment has different sets of features and it is impossible to test each
device. Some of the methods used in this project may not be available on every network-
ing device. In this case methods described here should be adopted accordingly.
Summarizing all of the above, this research aims to answer the following question: Is it
possible to reliably detect all known physical layer attacks in Ethernet networks by ob-
serving information available to the network devices? Additionally, it will be interesting to
see if there is a single metric which could be used to detect each physical layer attack in
Ethernet networks.
22 Theoretical background
2.1 General attacks classification
In order to get a picture of what the main classes of attacks are, it is important to under-
stand what the main security principles are, what security aims to protect and what se-
curity professionals care about. The Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) triad,
which is often considered to be the cornerstone of security, could be used to answer these
questions [5,11].
2.1.1 Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
The CIA triad or, simply, CIA is the most popular security model. It defines three main prin-
ciples which have to be guaranteed if a system is to be considered secure: Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability [6,63].
Figure 1 shows how Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability form a secure system.
Figure 1: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability relationship (Redrawn from [5,11]).
These three principles are described in detail as follows:
Confidentiality
Means that protected data should be accessible only by authorized people or sys-
tems [5,10].
3Integrity
Means that protected data should not be subject to unauthorized or undesirable
changes [7,6].
Availability
Means that protected data should be accessible whenever needed [7,6].
Security professionals agree that it is important to maintain a balance between Confiden-
tiality, Integrity and Availability of a system, despite the fact that sometimes it may be
challenging [5,10;8,12].
2.1.2 Disclosure, Alteration, Destruction
Some sources prefer to invert the CIA model and use it as DADModel (see figure 2). DAD
stands for Disclosure, Alteration, Destruction [8,11].
Figure 2: Disclosure, Alteration and Destruction (Redrawn from [8,11]).
As can be seen, DAD is CIA the other way around. Disclosure is opposite to Confidentiality,
Alteration is opposite to Integrity and Destruction is opposite to Availability. The DAD
model serves the same purpose as the CIA model, but it uses an opposite relation to the
information. CIA determines principles which should be provided by a system, whereas
DAD determines principles which should not be allowed by a system. [7,6.]
These key security principles lead to the main classes of the attacks. As illustrated in
figure 3, it is possible to classify attacks based on what they are targeting. [9,178;10,187-
194.]
4Figure 3: An overview of different attack types (Modified from [10,188]).
In this way attacks could be classified as attacks against Confidentiality, attacks against
Integrity and attacks against Availability.
2.1.3 Attacks on Confidentiality
The most common attack on confidentiality in networks is eavesdropping. Sometimes it is
also called sniffing. The essence of this attack is that the attacker who listens to network
traffic could potentially gain access to the passwords, emails, personal documents or other
sensitive information transfered over the network [11,541]. The amount of data available
to the attacker depends on the position in the network and on the portion of traffic which
is unencrypted.
Eavesdropping is not the only network attack against confidentiality. Man in the Middle
attack, covered in section 2.1.4 is also often violates confidentiality of a communication.
It allows the attacker to actively interfere with a traffic in order to gain access to the infor-
mation which was meant to be secret.
2.1.4 Attacks on Integrity
An example of the attacks on integrity are Man in the Middle attacks or MitM. MitM attacks
assume that an attacker gains access to a position in a network where all or part of the
traffic between a victim and the target server or network passes through him [12,257]. An
example of this attack is illustrated in figure 4.
Figure 4: An attacker performing MitM attack on a victim.
Remaining in this position an attacker can manipulate traffic in any desired way. For
example, it is possible to inject malicious code to web pages visited by the victim, modify
unencrypted emails send by the victim, or, simply, block access to certain resources.
5Here, MitM attacks are described as attacks against integrity. However, most of the time
they are attacks against the confidentiality as well. If the attacker circumvents encryp-
tion, or deals with plaintext traffic passing by, he has access to the information, which is
transferred, and therefore it is an attack against confidentiality as well.
Having a possibility to modify the traffic, the attacker can sometimes trick the victim into
an establishing unencrypted or significantly weakened connection to a server instead of
a properly encrypted connection [13,173;14,277-278]. Alternatively, if there is no proper
authentication in place, the attacker may trick the victim into an establishing encrypted
connection to a different endpoint, which will then establish encrypted connection to a
real server and acts as a proxy, forwarding the traffic between both ends [15,52]. If any
of these attacks are successful, the attacker will be able to see or manipulate the traffic
which was meant to be secret.
Another way to use MitM attack is to forward all traffic without any changes. In this case
MitM will efficiently become eavesdropping [16,1-3].
It is important to understand that MitM attacks require a special position in a network.
The attacker needs to have a possibility to receive traffic, modify it and send it on, while
original not-modified traffic should be discarded. This adds some limitations to which
network attacks can be used for MitM.
2.1.5 Attacks on Availability
The main class of the attacks on the availability is Denial of Service or DoS. The idea
behind a DoS attack is to render a system or some part of it unusable for legitimate users
[9,178].
DoS attacks can be divided into the following categories:
• exhaustion of resources
• crash or misbehaviour [9,178].
Exhaustion DoS attacks try to exceed the amount of data a host or a network can handle
and render it unusable for legitimate users, whereas other DoS attacks rely on the system
improperly handling certain type of data and crashing. A distinctive feature of the latter is
that often human intervention is needed to bring the system back online. [9,178-179.]
There is also a variety of DoS attacks called Distributed Denial of Service or DDoS. Es-
sentially they are the same as DoS attacks. The difference is that DDoS attacks are
performed from multiple points at the same time while DoS attacks are performed from a
6single point. Having an attack originating from multiple points at once makes it harder to
mitigate it. [17,17;9,179-180;18,117.]
2.1.6 Summary
To summarize all of the above: DoS and DDoS are attacks on the Availability, eavesdrop-
ping is an attack on Confidentiality and MitM is an attack on Integrity and Confidentiality.
After adding this information to figure 3, figure 5 was constructed. It shows examples of
attacks against the main security principles.
Figure 5: An overview of different attack types with examples (Modified from [10,188]).
This project focuses only on the following two attack classes: Eavesdropping and MitM.
Attacks on the availability (DoS) are not covered, as the whole nature of these attacks
makes them trivial to notice. Successful attacks on the availability of a network make the
network or a part of it non-functional, which is really easy to detect. Unsuccessful attacks,
on the other hand, do not cause network outages and it is harder to notice them. But if
they are unsuccessful, there will be no reasons to look for them. In contrast to that, both
Eavesdropping and MitM network attacks tend not to cause network outages and may
remain unnoticed for very long periods of time.
2.2 OSI network model
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is a model designed for the classifica-
tion of network protocols [19,18-19]. The OSI model includes seven layers, which are
application, presentation, session, transport, network, data link, physical. Each layer is
responsible for certain functions.
The functions of OSI layers from lowest to highest could be described as follows:
Physical layer (L1)
Defines functional electrical and mechanical control of data circuits physical media
is connected to.
Data link layer (L2)
Standardizes communication between stations on a single link.
7Network layer (L3)
Standardizes communication between stations across the network.
Transport layer (L4)
Is responsible for flow control and error-recovery.
Session layer (L5)
Is responsible for connections between applications.
Presentation layer (L6)
Is responsible for data representation for applications.
Application layer (L7)
Provides interface for end user applications.
[20,11-12]
Any network protocol could be placed on the OSI model. Some protocols are operating
on a single layer, while others are operating on multiple layers at the same time.
The OSI model incorporates the peer communication concept. Communications within
OSI model layers are independent of one another. Protocols interact with protocols on
the same OSI level, without having to be aware of the protocols being used on the other
layers. [21,6.]
2.3 TCP/IP network model
The OSI network model is not the only model used for network protocols classification.
There is another model which could be used for this purpose. It is called Transmission
Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) model, or DoD Model. DoD abbreviation
comes from the US Department of Defence, which was responsible for its development.
TCP/IP model has only four layers: application, transport, internet and a network interface
layer. These layers can be mapped on the OSI model in the way shown in table 1. [19,24.]
Table 1: TCP/IP model mapped onto OSI model (Copied from [19,24]).
OSI model TCP/IP model
Application layer Application layer
Presentation layer
Session layer
Transport layer Transport layer
Network layer Internet layer
Data-Link layer Network interface layer
Physical layer
8To cover the same functionality with a fewer number of layers, some of the TCP/IP model
layers perform functions of several OSI model layers at once. As mentioned in chapter 1,
attacks covered in this project are located on the OSI physical layer, or network interface
layer of the TCP/IP model.
2.4 Ethernet networks
Ethernet is a set of standards describing Local Area Network (LAN) technologies. It re-
sides on OSI physical (L1) and data link (L2) layers . Ethernet includes standards for
different media and speeds. It defines media specifications, physical signaling, frame
structure and addressing on L2. [4,11-13.]
2.4.1 Ethernet on the OSI model
As it is already said in the beginning of this section, Ethernet is located on the OSI layers
L1 and L2. However, the Ethernet standard IEEE 802.3 defines more precise division to a
sublayers, then the OSI model. There are four sublayers: Logical Link Control (LLC), Me-
dia Access Control (MAC), physical signaling and media specifications. These sublayers
are mapped to the OSI model in the way shown in figure 6. [20,12.]
Figure 6: Ethernet sublayers (Copied from [20,13]).
The LLC sublayer is independent of Ethernet and standardized in a separate standard:
IEEE LLC [20,12]. MAC layer is the same for all versions of Ethernet, whereas physical
layer standards differ between Ethernet varieties. [20,13.] This research focuses on phys-
ical layer attacks on the networks and out of these four sublayers the main interest is in
the Ethernet media specifications and physical signaling.
92.4.2 Media specifications
Ethernet networks can function over a wide variety of cable types: coaxial cables, Un-
shielded Twisted Pair (UTP) cables, Shielded Twisted Pair (STP) cables and fiber optic
cables. There are multiple different Ethernet signaling standards for each of these media
types. Different standards provide different speeds and have different requirements to a
media. [22,44.]
For example, Gigabit Ethernet (1000BASE-T), Fast Ethernet (100BASE-TX) and a legacy
10BASE-T and all are able to function on the same category 5 cable, providing differ-
ent speeds. At the same time newer and faster standards, such as 10 Gigabit Ethernet
(10GBASE-T) would not work over the same category 5 cables and require at least cate-
gory 6 cables. [23,703.]
Out of this available medias this project focuses on the twisted pair cables. Coaxial cables
are not covered because they are outdated and not used in modern networks anymore.
Fiber optical cables are not as widely used for horizontal cabling as twisted pair cables and
they require expensive equipment in order to manipulate with them. Therefore, they are
less likely to become a target for an attacker. That are the reasons behind a decision to
focus on the twisted pair cables. Even though this project covers only Ethernet networks
with twisted pair media, some of the methods described in it may be applied to other
Ethernet media with minor modifications
Twisted pair cables are divided into several categories based on a TIA/EIA 568 standard
[20,211]. TIA/EIA 568 is a vendor-independent standard for cabling specifications de-
veloped by Telecommunication Industries Associations (TIA) and Electronic Industries
Association (EIA) [20,207].
Cable categories are numbered from one onwards, one being the oldest. The bare mini-
mum in modern networks is to use category 5 cables. As mentioned before, category five
cables are suitable for use with Ethernet speeds up to a Gigabit. 10BASE-T is the only
standard which can work over cables with a lower category: category 3 and 4 cables.
UTP cables usually have four pairs of wires, but some of them may remain unused, de-
pending on the used speed.
10BASE-T
Uses two pairs of category 3 or better cables
100BASE-TX
Uses two pairs of category 5 or better cables
1000BASE-T
Uses four pairs of category 5 or better cables
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10GBASE-T
Uses four pairs of category 6 or better cables
For convenience wires are colored in pairs: green and white-green, orange and white-
orange, blue and white-blue, and brown and white-brown. Ethernet over twisted pair uses
RJ-45 connectors and sockets to connect cables to a devices. The most widespread
wiring schemes used for twisted pair cables are T568A and T568B [24,130]. Figure 7
shows wiring schemes both connector types.
Figure 7: T568A and T568B connectors wiring.
As can be seen, T568B is essentially the T568A with white and orange pairs swapped
[24,131].
There are two types of Ethernet interfaces on the network equipment: medium depen-
dent interface (MDI) and medium dependent interface crossed (MDI-X) [25,110]. These
interfaces differ in the choice wire pairs, which they use to transfer and receive data. On
100BASE-TX and 10BASE-T MDI interfaces use pins 1 and 2 to transmit and pins 3 and
4 to receive. MDI-X does use these pairs in the opposite way. This raises a question
about interconnecting devices with the same or different interface types. Different cables
are required to connect different interface types.
To connect MDI and MDI-X interfaces a straight-through cable should be used. If both
ends of a cable use connectors with the same wiring, the cable is straight-through. Dia-
gram of a straight-through cable is shown in figure 8.
Figure 8: Wiring diagram of a four-wire straight-through cable.
Straight-through cables connect pin 1 on the one end to a pin 1 on the other end, pin 2 to
the pin 2 and so on. In this way transmitting pins of MDI interface are connected to the
receiving pins of a MDI-X interface and vice versa.
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In order to connect two interfaces of the same type (MDI or MDI-X) a crossover cable is
required. Crossover cable uses one T568B connector and one T568A connector. Figure 9
shows a diagram of a crossover cable.
Figure 9: Wiring diagram of a four-wire crossover cable.
A crossover cable connects pins 1 and 2 on one end to the pins 3 and 4 on the other
end and pins 3 and 4 on the first end to pins 1 and 2 on the second end. In this way
transmitting pins of one interface are connected to a receiving pins of another interface
and vice versa.
To eliminate the need of using different cable types for different interfaces, auto MDI-X
was developed. It allows automatic detection of a cable type and selection of appropriate
pairs for data transfer and reception. [4,280.]
Unlike 10BASE-T and 100BASE-TX, 1000BASE-T and newer standards use all four pairs
to transmit and receive data at the same time. These standards all have auto MDI-X built
in and enabled by default. [4,280.]
2.4.3 Power over Ethernet
It is important to mention Power over Ethernet (PoE) as it would be used in a testing
topology. PoE is a technology of providing a power to an end device over an Ethernet
twisted pair cable. It is usually used to power devices such as IP phones, security cameras
or wireless access points.
The most widely used PoE is defied in IEEE standard 802.3af [4,89]. There is an exten-
sion to that standard - IEEE 802.3at, which allows devices to provide more power. This
standard defines two possible device roles: Powered Device (PD) and Power Sourcing
Equipment (PSE). PSE is a device which provides power. PSE may be provided by a net-
working device such as a switch, or by a separate power injector. PD is a device which
is powered by PSE. [4,92.]
The standards define methods for detecting if a PoE capable device (PD) is connected to
a port. When the PD is detected, PSE and PD negotiate amount of power, provided on a
cable. The amount of power is determined by a class of a PD. [4,94-97.]
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Table 2 shows available PD classes.
Table 2: PoE power classes (Copied from [4,96]).
Class Power at PSE output (watts) Description
0 15.4 Unclassified
1 4.0 Very low power
2 7.0 Low power
3 15.4 Mid power
4 36.0 High power
Class zero is the default class for devices which do not support power negotiation. In this
case full power is provided to a device (15.4 watt). [4,95.]
PoE uses two pairs of wires to provide the power. One pair is used for negative current
and another for positive. There are two alternatives to provide power over Ethernet: over
data pairs or over spare pairs. The pairs used for the current are negotiated between PSE
and PD. [4,98.]
There aremultiple other versions and standards of PoE, some of which are vendor-specific
[4,105-106]. They are not covered in this section.
2.5 Monitoring network traffic
This section is focused on the available methods and tools for network traffic monitoring,
such as port mirroring and network taps. Even though these are meant for legitimate use
by network engineers and system administrators to troubleshoot network-related prob-
lems, they could be used by malicious actors to perform eavesdropping. That is why
these technologies are covered in this project.
There are software sniffers available for all major operating systems [26,35]. Sniffer soft-
ware switches network card in a promiscuous mode and captures all network traffic which
reaches the network card [26,18]. They have a wide variety of features, such as packet
dissection, stream assembly, powerful filters and much more [26,74-76]. So, why are any
additional methods or devices needed?
Software sniffers are good for analyzing the traffic seen on a cable. The problem arises
when there is a need to monitor a traffic which does not originate from or is not meant
for the PC running a sniffer. During the operation switches learn where the devices are
located and use this information to forward non-broadcast traffic directly to the correct port.
In this way, non-broadcast traffic is only forwarded to a port with the destination device,
meaning that devices behind other ports are not able to see this traffic, regardless of the
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mode their network card operates in [26,20]. Moreover, sometimes there is a need to
monitor network traffic from a different LAN, which is separated from a sniffer by a router,
and this traffic is not forwarded to a network with a sniffer at all. This is exactly the reason
the monitoring tools and methods mentioned in the beginning of this section are used for.
2.5.1 Port mirroring
Port mirroring is a feature of a switch, which allows a switch to be configured so that
it copies all incoming, outgoing or both directions of a traffic from a selected port to a
designated monitoring port [26,35].
There are also variations of port mirroring, which allow to transfer traffic of a selected port
across multiple switches and L3 networks respectively [27,405;27,408]. Depending on a
vendor names and details of this feature may vary. For example, port mirroring is called
Catalyst Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN) in Cisco terminology [27,400].
2.5.2 Taps
Network taps are separate network devices, designed to copy all the traffic which passes
through it without modifying the original traffic in any way[26,24]. Network taps are in-
stalled in the middle of the existing network link.
Network taps have some extra features compared to switches with port mirroring function-
ality, such as:
Failsafe
When a tap loses power, it will connect the wires of the cables directly so that the
traffic continues to flow.
Link failure propagation
If a link goes down on one port, tap will turn off a link on the other port as well.
Speed synchronization
A tap negotiates the same speed and duplex on both ports.
PoE passthrough
A tap allows power over Ethernet to pass through it.
Built-in battery
When a tap loses power, it will continue to work on a battery for some time.
There is an opinion that Fast Ethernet taps and Gigabit Ethernet taps rely on different
principles to be able to function. Particularly, Fast Ethernet taps use high impedance
repeater equipment, while Gigabit Ethernet taps terminate an Ethernet link. [28]
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2.6 Physical layer attacks
This section describes known attacks on Ethernet over twisted pair networks. The only
exception are DoS attacks, which are not covered in this research. The reasoning behind
that decision was explained in section 2.1.6.
Figure 10 shows an example segment of a network, which is used to illustrate possible
attack points.
Figure 10: Example network segment.
The targets of attacks covered in this research are twisted pair cables between network
devices, not the devices themselves. Figure 11 shows the target scope of possible at-
tacks.
Figure 11: Target scope of the attacks.
Attacks can occur anywhere along the cable, or on either of the cable ends.
Some of the attacks rely on an attacker connecting additional network devices to a net-
work, such as a network tap or a switch. These devices use standard RJ-45 sockets for
connections. In this case, the attacker can unplug the cable from one of the end devices,
connect this cable to his equipment and use extra network cable to connect another port
of his device to the end device. This scenario is shown in figure 12.
?
Figure 12: Example of an attack on the cable end.
Attacks described above are happening on the end of a cable. However, it does not always
have to happen there. It is possible to perform such an attack even if the attacker has no
access to any of the cable ends.
Twisted pair cables are made of relatively thin wires and isolation. And they can be easily
cut with a knife or a scissors. Later it is possible to put new RJ-45 connectors on it with a
help of inexpensive crimping tool. [4,271].
15
After reflecting this on the example network segment, figure 13 will be constructed.
?
Figure 13: Example of an attack along the cable.
The process of cutting a cable and attaching new connectors to it, depending on the skills,
will take a fewminutes. If attack is performed out of work hours, link downtimemay remain
unnoticed.
2.6.1 Hub
Hub interconnects all devices connected to it, retransmitting every received message to
the each port (except of the port the message was received on). In this way everyone,
gets a copy of all the traffic transmitted over a hub. However, there is a limitation to it, due
to a nature of a hub, it can carry only one signal at a time. Therefore, devices connected
to a hub cannot receive and transmit at the same time. This mode of operation is called
half-duplex. [29,57.]
Using any of the methods described above it is possible to perform eavesdropping attack
by inserting a hub between the devices under attack. Figure 14 shows how a hub can be
used for an attack.
Figure 14: Example of an attack with a hub.
To perform an attack the attacker needs to connect attacked devices through a hub and
connect a sniffer to the hub.
Besides the fact that hubs are outdated and do not support speeds faster than 100BASE-
TX, they work only in half duplexmode [29,56]. Therefore, link under attack would degrade
to a half duplex when hub is connected. Such behaviour could be easily detected. Due
to these facts, no experiments with a hub would be performed.
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2.6.2 Switch with port mirroring
The attacker may replace a hub with a switch which supports port mirroring to perform
another variant of eavesdropping attack. This is reflected in figure 15.
Figure 15: Example of an attack with a switch with port mirroring functionality.
Using a switch instead of a hub allows the attacker to stay less noticeable, as switches
support full duplex mode, unlike hubs [29,65]. Therefore, they can establish connections
in a full duplex mode, without downgrading a link duplex.
However, depending on speeds supported by devices under attack and a switch, the
speed of a link may change. When both switch and a device connected to it support
speed negotiation, they establish a link on a higher speed supported by both devices
[4,67]. Depending on a speeds supported by a switch, the speed of a link between a
switch and an end device may be lower or higher than the speed of a link before an attack
was performed. If the maximum speed supported by end devices is different, they may
negotiate links with different speeds, which may be used to detect an attack. Test results
regarding these assumptions may be found in section 4.3.
2.6.3 Electrically active Ethernet tap
The attacker can use an Ethernet tap instead of a switch with port mirroring and achieve
the same result. Figure 16 shows how a tap can be used for this attack.
TAP
Figure 16: Example of an attack with an electrically active tap.
Additional features built in taps may make a tap less noticeable than a switch. For exam-
ple, if device power goes down, a tap should reconnect wires directly, so that the link will
continue working. Another example is that taps maintain the same speed and duplex on
both ports. Switches do not usually have this functionality. [30]
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2.6.4 Electrically passive Ethernet tap
Unlike the taps described before, the tap covered in this section does not require any
external power source to function. That is why it is called electrically passive.
As mentioned in section 2.4.2, 100BASE-TX and 10BASE-T Ethernet standards use only
two pairs of wires in a cable. One pair of wires is used to transfer the data in one direction
and a second pair of wires is used to transfer the data in the opposite direction.
First Ethernet networks used a single shared coaxial cable to interconnect multiple net-
work devices. To achieve this, straight-through bus topology was used. Even though
Ethernet over twisted pair cables uses dedicated cable to interconnect each pair of net-
work devices, 100BASE-TX and 10BASE-T standards are still able to work over a bus
topology. In a fact, Ethernet hub incorporates a bus topology inside itself. So, in any
network segment with a hub network devices share the same bus. [29,56.]
The fact that both 100BASE-TX and 10BASE-T are able to function over a sharedmedium,
results in an interesting attack vector. The attack consist of an attacker connecting the
listening pins of his Network Interface Controller (NIC) in parallel to a pair of wires in a
cable, which is being attacked. After that the original link continues to work as before and
the attacker gets a copy of a traffic flowing on this pair. If the attacker connects a second
NIC in the same way to a second pair of wires, he gains access to a copy of the traffic
flowing in another direction. [28]
Figure 17 shows an example of this attack. Monitoring cables for the attacker are marked
TAP1 and TAP2.
Figure 17: Wiring diagram of an electrically passive Ethernet tap.
This attack does not work on a faster Ethernet networks, such as 1000BASE-T and
10GBASE-T, as they use all four pairs of wire for data transfer and they were not designed
to work over the bus.
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There are different practical approaches towards performing this attack. It is possible to
use a separate circuit with RJ-45 sockets, which connects monitoring interfaces in parallel
to the wires of a cable. An example of this approach is a Throwing Star LAN Tap by Great
Scott Gadgets [31]. It is shown in figure 18.
Figure 18: Throwing Star LAN Tap (Copied from [31]).
Using a separate device with a standard RJ-45 connectors leaves the cable intact. How-
ever, it requires the attacker to reconnect a cable, when performing an attack. This usually
causes a downtime, which may be undesirable.
If downtime is highly undesirable, a second approach may be used. This approach in-
volves connecting listening wires directly to a cable which is attacked. After isolation is
removed, listening cables may be soldered, or connected in any other way to the trans-
mitting wires.
One clever and easy way of connecting listening cables is to use a standard RJ-45 sockets.
After that standard Ethernet cables are used to connect a tap to the listening network cards.
Figure 19 shows a photo of such a tap.
Figure 19: Ethernet tap example (Copied from [32]).
Even though this attack only works on 100BASE-TX and 10BASE-T networks, it is pos-
sible to perform it on faster networks as well. If the attacker cuts open the remaining
wires in a cable, devices would not be able to negotiate any speed which requires all four
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pairs and they will fall back to a Fast Ethernet connection. [4,79] Throwing Star LAN Tap
has capacitors connected in line with remaining wires to achieve the same effect. These
capacitors degrade a link quality, so that 1000BASE-T does not work on this link. [31]
2.6.5 PC bridge man in the middle
During the MitM attack network traffic flow has to be modified so that traffic will go through
an attacker's computer or appliance. This project covers physical layer attacks, so only
physical ways of redirecting the traffic would be considered. All the victim's traffic should
go through the attacker's PC and only through it, so that an unmodified version of traffic
would not be visible in the network. This condition leaves the only option: an existing
Ethernet link should be terminated at the attacker's PC and a new Ethernet link should go
from the attacker's PC further.
Figure 20: An example of a PC bridge MitM attack.
The attacker has to have at least two NICs in his PC, so that he/she can connect to both
Ethernet cables at the same time.
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3 Methods and materials
This chapter provides a list of attacks which are selected for testing, followed by a set
of metrics, which are available from network devices and could be used to detect phys-
ical layer attacks. A general description of each metric is provided as well as technical
details on how these metrics are extracted in a test environment. In the end the testing
environment is described.
3.1 Selected attacks
To have a wide coverage of various attacks, the following attacks are selected for testing:
PC bridge MitM
Attack is described in section 2.6.5
Switch with port mirroring
Attack is described in section 2.6.2
Electrically passive tap (Throwing Star LAN Tap)
Attack is described in section 2.6.4
Electrically passive tap with direct connection to the wires
Attack is described in section 2.6.4
Electrically active 100BASE-TX capable tap
Attack is described in section 2.6.3
Electrically active 1000BASE-T capable tap
Attack is described in section 2.6.3.
As one may notice, one attack, which was covered in section 2.6, is not included in this
list. This is an attack with an Ethernet hub. Section 2.6.1 provides an attack description,
as well as the reasoning why it is not tested in this project.
Another interesting fact about the list of selected attacks is that there are two different
attacks involving electrically active taps. The first attack uses Net Optics TP-CU tap, which
does not support Gigabit Ethernet, and the second uses Net Optics TP-CU3-ZD tap, which
supports Gigabit Ethernet [33;30]. The reason for testing attacks with two different taps is
that, Gigabit Ethernet capable taps are believed to be based on different principles then
Fast Ethernet taps, as mentioned in section 2.5.2. The difference in the way these taps
work may make one of them easier to detect than another.
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Generally speaking, an attack is considered successful, if after performing the setup
phase, the link is functional and the end device is reachable. Short downtimes during
the attack setup phase are tolerated. Moreover, they could be used as an indicator of
attacks as well. However, if the end device is not reachable after the attack setup, then
the attack is considered unsuccessful and no measurements are performed on that link.
3.2 Metrics
As mentioned in chapter 1, this projects aims to detect physical layer attacks on Ethernet
networks, using only the commonly available networking equipment, which is used in a
network infrastructures. In other words, most of the attack detection methods described
here should be applicable to the arbitrary network without a need for any additional equip-
ment.
This section focuses on determining the set of metrics which are available on the standard
networking devices and could be used to detect the selected attacks. Here, metric is a
property of a connection between two network devices. Some of the metrics will change
their value during attacks, which would be an indicator of compromise.
It is important to mention that even though the goal of a research is to detect attacks any-
where in a network, actual testing is done on each link separately. A network is treated as
a composition of individual links between devices. If there is a way to detect an attack on
a single link, then it is just a matter of scaling up the same technique in order to detect the
same attack anywhere in a network. Later on all of the discussed metrics are applicable
to a single link only.
Measurements are carried out to gain metric values. Measurements could be divided into
two groups: passive and active. A measurement would be called passive, if it does not
change any network parameters of a link. In contrast, a measurement would be called
active, if it introduces any changes to a link.
Following subsections cover in detail selected metrics, which potentially may be used for
detecting physical layer network attacks.
3.2.1 Link state
A link state shows whether the link is up and functioning or down and non functioning.
The terms on and off could be used in the same meaning. Although it is possible to have
links in a topology which are constantly disabled, we would not be focusing on them, as
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they usually pose no interest to attackers. Thus, an expected default state of the link is
up.
Link state as a passive metric
A link state can be used as a passive metric. In this case it is enough to observe the
link state over time and detect changes in it. Normal behaviour of the link state depends
on an environment. Links to the end devices could change their state as end device
is restarted, powered off or disconnected, however links between network devices are
usually expected to be constantly up.
It is expected that, if the link state goes down and back up again, it can be an indica-
tor of attack. It may happen when Ethernet cable is disconnected from one device and
connected to another, or cable is cut, crimped and connected to a networking device.
However, links could go down for various non-malicious reasons, such as problems with
a cable, or device on the other end being powered off or restarted. This metric is expected
to be prone to a false positives.
Link state as an active metric
It may be possible to use a link state as an active metric. During active measurements it
is necessary to change the link state on one end of a cable and check a link state on the
other end of a cable. It is expected that the link state of another end of a cable goes down
and then up during. If the link state on the other end of a cable does not match the link
state on the first end of a cable, it may be an indicator that the devices are not connected
directly to one another. If there is no way to check a link state on the other end of a link
during a test, indirect indicators could be used, such as logs on a device or Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) renewal request when the link goes up again.
3.2.2 Link speed
Link speed as a passive metric
Passively observing a link speed over time and detecting any changes in it should be
possibly to detect changes in a network. It is expected that the link speed may downgrade
during some of the attacks. For example, electrically passive Ethernet taps do not support
speeds higher than 100Mb/s [31;28]. A link speedmay fluctuate for various non-malicious
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reasons. However, in a well-maintained environment a link speed fluctuation should be
investigated, as it could be an indicator of other problems, such as physical media or
hardware problems. [20,93;20,359]
Link speed as an active metric
A link speed may be used as an active metric as well. By changing a link speed on one
end of a cable and checking a link speed on the other end of a cable, it may be possible
to detect if devices are not connected directly to each other. It is expected that during the
normal conditions, depending on whether or not the link speed auto negotiation is enabled
on a device on the other end of a cable, the link would be renegotiated on the same speed
as set on the first device, or it will stop working. If the link speed on the other end does
not change during a test, it may be an indicator of an attack.
3.2.3 Link duplex
Link duplex as a passive metric
Observing a link duplex values over time and detecting changes in it, may be used as
a metric as well. It is expected that during the normal operation the link duplex stays
the same all the time. If the link duplex changes its value, it may be an indicator of an
attack. A link duplex may fluctuate for various non-malicious reasons. However, in a well-
maintained environment a link duplex fluctuation should be investigated, as it could be an
indicator of other problems, such as physical media or hardware problems.
Link duplex as an active metric
To use a link duplex as an active metric it is necessary to change the link duplex on one
end of a cable and then check a link duplex on the other end of a cable. It is expected
that depending on whether or not the link duplex auto negotiation is enabled on a device
on the other end of a cable, the link would be renegotiated on the same duplex as set on
the first device, or it will stop working. If the link duplex does not change during a test, it
is an indicator that devices are not directly connected to each other.
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3.2.4 Power over Ethernet
Switch ports capable of being a PSE, know if device on the other end is a PD and for each
PD they know it's class and a requested power [4,92-97]. These values can be used as a
metrics as well. It is expected that they stay the same all the time, as PD do not change
its properties over time.
3.2.5 Observed cable length
Some of the network devices support Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) on their network
ports. TDR allows a device to measure a cable length with certain accuracy and detect
cable faults, if any. [34;35,160.]
It is expected that the observed cable length stays close to the same value over the time,
as well as the status of the cable pairs stays the same. Some fluctuations in a cable
length are expected, as tests are performed on a live link and some variations in results
may happen. However, if observed cable length changes dramatically in either direction
or cable-fault indicator appears, it is an indicator that something on a link have changed.
For example, cable was replaced with a cable of a different length, or extra equipment
was connected to a cable.
This metric would react to a non-malicious cable changes as well. For example, cable re-
placed due to a network improvement may cause change in the metric value. However, if
company implements proper change control, authorized cable change should be reflected
in the documentation [36,725].
3.2.6 Observed cable wiring
Some of the cable-testing functions provide information about the cable wiring [34]. This
information also could be observed. If cable wiring suddenly changes, it is an indicator that
the cable was replaced with a cable of a different type, or tampered with, which requires
further investigation.
3.2.7 Error counters
Network devices usually provide multiple counters on per-interface basis. Some of these
counters could be used in conjunction with specially generated traffic to form active met-
rics. For example, one device generates multiple frames with incorrect Frame Check Se-
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quence (FCS), jumbo frames or runt frames. Normal behaviour for a switch is to discard
such frames and increment corresponding error counters. It is expected that the corre-
sponding error counters would increase on the device on the other end of a cable [37,23].
If it does not happen, it is an indicator that the device have not received these frames.
Most likely the reason for such behaviour is that devices are not connected directly and
there is a device between, which filtered these frames.
3.2.8 Latency
Latency shows how long it takes for a frame to reach the other device. There is no direct
metric on a switch corresponding to a link latency. However, if switch has an IP address, it
may be possible to use Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ping, or other protocols
to get Round-Trip Time (RTT) to the device on the other end of a cable. [38,6.]
It is expected that the latency, being the characteristic of a link, will remain approximately
the same all the time. However, this test utilizes Central Processing Unit (CPU) resources,
therefore its results could be inaccurate depending on the CPU load [39,245]. Another
factor which may affect the test results is the link congestion, caused by a non test network
traffic passing the link during the test. This traffic may interfere with the test traffic and
cause higher latency values [38,6]. But, if latency increases significantly, it may be a sign
that a slow device is inserted in between the devices.
3.2.9 Link quality
ICMP ping test described in the previous chapter provides one more valuable output:
amount of lost packets. It can be used as a metric as well. This counter shows how many
ICMP packets were lost during the test. This value closely correlate with a link quality and
may be influenced by an additional equipment connected during attacks.
3.2.10 Throughput
Throughput is a characteristic of a network, which shows how much data per second can
be transfered over it. The same way as with latency, there are no direct metric available
from a switch which shows throughput of a link. Active tests are required to measure
throughput values.
Common way of measuring throughput is to transfer as much data as possible through a
tested network over a given period of time. There may be difficulties in suchmeasurement,
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due to a normal non-test network traffic taking a part of available throughput, which lowers
results showed by a throughput test. Another important aspect is that suchmeasurements
may be harmful for production networks, as they temporary place a link under high load.
Maybe such tests should be performed only out of business hours. It is expected that
the throughput of a link remains the same over time If it drops significantly, it should be
investigated, as some other device may have been added to a network, or other link
parameters may have degraded.
3.3 Environment
Designing a test topology for this project is a challenging task, as there are some contro-
versial requirements. For the quality of results it is beneficial to have multitude of links
in a system, each with a different combination of parameters and capabilities, that would
provide granular information about the way each metric behave depending on the link
properties. However, each link should be thoroughly tested in a normal conditions and
during each of the attacks. That leads to a huge number of measurements. For example,
having 6 attacks and 10 metrics would require 140 measurements per link in a topology.
That is one measurement per metric for each end of a link for each attack plus baseline
measurements.
3.3.1 Topology
The topology used for tests is a compromise between these two requirements. There is
a small number of links in total with wide diversity of a link parameters and features. This
topology is shown in figure 21.
Figure 21: Topology used for experiment.
As one can see there are only three links in a topology, which keeps the overall amount
of required measurements small enough. At the same time topology provides desired
diversity by including connections with different speeds, cable types, cable lengths and
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features.
For people familiar with network designing process this topology may seem absurd, as
it does not have logical structure and it uses two switches, where one would have been
enough, also it has a 1000BASE-T capable port connected to a port, which supports only
100BASE-TX. Please, keep in mind that this topology is designed for testing and the main
focus is to have a wide variety of link parameters.
As mentioned in section 3.1, six attacks are selected for testing. section 2.6 provided
attacks description. As can be seen, five out of six attacks use standard RJ-45 connec-
tors and sockets for connecting additional equipment to a cable. The remaining attack is
performed along the cable and does not require an Ethernet connector.
Even though, the first five attacks require RJ-45 connector, in order to connect attack
equipment, they do not necessary have to happen at the end of a cable. It is possible to
perform such attacks anywhere along the cable, as well. Ethernet UTP and STP cables
could be easily crimped. Which makes it possible for an attacker to cut the cable at any
point, crimp both ends and use them to connect his equipment.
When attack is happening on the either end of a cable, extra cable is required to connect
the attacker's equipment to the existing network equipment. Cable used for that may be
straight through or crossover. When attack happens along the cable, cable is cut and
crimped. In a process of crimping different wiring schemes could be used for each of the
connectors (T568A or T568B). All of the above means that for each of these five attacks
additional network equipment can be connected to a link in eight different ways:
1. One end of a cable
a) Straight through cable
b) Crossover cable
2. Somewhere along the cable
a) T568A and T568A
b) T568A and T568B
c) T568B and T568A
d) T568B and T568B
3. Another end of a cable
a) Straight through cable
b) Crossover cable
Thus, in order to cover all possible ways of performing these attacks, it is necessary to per-
form each of these attacks eight times on the each link. Which makes an overall amount
of measurements required for this project too big. To make the amount of measurements
manageable, such attacks would be tested only once per link. The attack point and a
connection cable would be defined for each link separately.
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The only attack which does not involve connecting to a cable with Ethernet connectors is
electrically passive Ethernet tap with direct connection to the wires, which was described
in section 2.6.4. It relies on stripping the cable isolation and connecting listening wires
directly to the transmitting and receiving pairs of the cable. This attack damages a cable,
therefore it is unacceptable to use this cable for any other tests after this attack is tested.
In order to keep the topology identical for all the attacks and main network cables intact,
this attack would be performed on a short cables connected directly to the end of each
topology link using a coupler. The topology updated with consideration of the short cables
is shown in figure 22. Short cables are marked in red.
Figure 22: Topology used for experiment with actual cables displayed.
These short cables will remain in the topology constantly, so that it is the same for all
the attacks. Cables damaged during the attacks would be replaced with a similar new
ones after the attack is over and before the next one. The same cables would be used
to connect the attacker's network equipment for other attacks. The attacker's equipment
would be connected instead of couplers. Attack points for the electrically passive Ethernet
tap with direct connection to the wires are in the middle of short cables.
3.3.2 Equipment
Topology includes two Cisco switches with and without PoE support, as well as full or lim-
ited TDR support, PC and an wireless access point. These network devices were selected
with a goal of using standard common network equipment with no special features.
SW1 is a Cisco Catalyst 2960 switch. It has 24 Fast Ethernet ports and two Gigabit ports.
TDR is supported on all the ports. Fast Ethernet ports only provide information about two
pairs of wires. Gigabit ports provide information about all four pairs of wires. PoE is not
supported by this switch. [40,26.41,19] SW2 is a Cisco Catalyst 3560v2 switch. It has 24
Fast Ethernet ports and two Small Form-factor Pluggable (SFP) slots. TDR is supported
on the Fast Ethernet ports. Fast Ethernet ports only provide information about two pairs
of wires. PoE is supported by all Fast Ethernet ports on this switch. [42,4;42,17.] Detailed
information about switches SW1 and SW2 is available in appendices 1 and 2 respectfully.
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Access point is UniFi UAP-PRO. It is capable of being a PD and receiving a power over
the Ethernet cable. [43,6.]
3.4 Gathering metrics
In order to have precise and reliable results, it is important to have information about the
processes happening in the network devices at all the time while performing experiments.
There aremultiple ways tomanagemost of the devices. All testing devices are in the same
location, therefore standard management methods can be used. Switches have serial
console connection for management, PC could be managed via keyboard and mouse.
Access point do not have a separate management interface and has to be managed via
network.
Following sections provide technical details on how to obtain metrics results from a Cisco
switch and a Linux PC. UniFi UAP-PRO access point is Linux based and has Secure Shell
(SSH) access. Therefore, Linux PC commands should work. However, if there are any
differences, it would be separately noted.
3.4.1 Link state as a passive metric
Commands illustrated in listing 1 and listing 2 could be used to obtain current link state
on a Cisco switch and a Linux PC respectfully.
SW1#show ip interface brief Gi0/1
Interface IP-Address OK? Method Status Protocol
GigabitEthernet0/1 unassigned YES unset up up
Listing 1: Example output of show ip interface brief command on a switch (SW1).
Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS) show ip interface brief command pro-
vides an information about the interface status and IP address assigned it [44,66].
# ip link show eth0
2: eth0: <BROADCAST ,MULTICAST ,UP,LOWER_UP > mtu 1500 qdisc mq state UP
mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
link/ether 78:e7:d1:86:a1:c9 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
Listing 2: Example output of ip link show command on a Linux PC (PC).
ip link show command is a command from the Linux iproute2 toolset, which provides
detailed information about a link and its parameters [45,203].
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3.4.2 Link state as an active metric
As mentioned in section 3.2.1, an active link state metric assumes that the link state is
changed on one device and observed on the second device. Above it was described
how to check a link state on a Cisco switch and on a Linux PC. To disable an interface
on a Cisco switch shutdown command in an interface configuration section may be used.
Iproute2 ip link set dev eth0 down command disables an interface on a Linux system.
To bring interfaces back Cisco no shutdown command and Linux ip link set dev eth0
up commands are used.
For some unknown reason neither ip link set dev eth0 down nor ip link set
dev eth0 up works on the AP. Corresponding ifconfig commands do not work as well.
Therefore, active link speed tests were not performed from the AP.
3.4.3 Link speed and duplex as passive metrics
Commands to get current speed and duplex of an interface on a Cisco switch and on a
Linux PC are provided in listing 3 and listing 4 respectfully.
SW1#show interface Gi 0/1 status
Port Name Status Vlan Duplex Speed Type
Gi0/1 connected 1 a-full a-100 10/100/1000BaseTX
Listing 3: Example output of show interface status command on a switch (SW1).
Cisco IOS show interface status command provides an information about the interface
status, speed and duplex [36,251].
# ethtool eth0
Settings for eth0:
Supported ports: [ TP ]
Supported link modes: 10baseT/Half 10baseT/Full
100baseT/Half 100baseT/Full
1000baseT/Half 1000baseT/Full
Supported pause frame use: No
Supports auto-negotiation: Yes
Advertised link modes: 10baseT/Half 10baseT/Full
100baseT/Half 100baseT/Full
1000baseT/Half 1000baseT/Full
Advertised pause frame use: Symmetric
Advertised auto-negotiation: Yes
Link partner advertised link modes: 10baseT/Half 10baseT/Full
100baseT/Half 100baseT/Full
1000baseT/Half 1000baseT/Full
Link partner advertised pause frame use: No
Link partner advertised auto-negotiation: Yes
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Speed: 1000Mb/s
Duplex: Full
Port: Twisted Pair
PHYAD: 1
Transceiver: internal
Auto-negotiation: on
MDI-X: on
Supports Wake-on: g
Wake-on: g
Current message level: 0x000000ff (255)
drv probe link timer ifdown ifup rx_err tx_err
Link detected: yes
Listing 4: Example output of ethtool command on a Linux PC (PC).
Linux ethtool command provides detailed information about a speed and duplex modes
of an interface [45,205]. Alternatively mii-tool or log messages may be used to deter-
mine a link speed and duplex on a Linux system [46,302-303].
Example of a log messages produced on a PC when the link is established is shown in
listing 5.
eth0: Link is up at 1000 Mbps, full duplex
Listing 5: Example of a log message generated on a Linux system when a network
connection is established.
Unfortunately, neither of the methods described above work on the AP. It has no ethtool
or mii-tool binaries installed and no log entries are generated on a link status change.
Therefore, no active link speed or duplex tests would be performed to or from it.
3.4.4 Link speed and duplex as active metrics
Following the steps described in section 3.2.2 and in section 3.2.3, link speed and duplex
should be changed on one device and observed on the other device to form active link
speed and active link duplex metrics. Previous section showed how link speed and duplex
values may be obtained on a Cisco switch and on a Linux PC. To change speed of a link
on a Cisco switch speed command in an interface configuration section is used. Duplex of
a link is changed with a duplex command in the same configuration section. Linux uses
ethtool or mii-tool commands to achieve the same result.
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3.4.5 Power over Ethernet
To obtain power over Ethernet related information from a Cisco switch show power inline
command is used. Example output of this command is shown in listing 6.
SW2#show power inline Fa 0/2
Interface Admin Oper Power Device Class Max
(Watts)
--------- ------ ---------- ------- ------------------- ----- ----
Fa0/2 auto on 15.4 Ieee PD 4 15.4
Listing 6: Output of a show power inline command for a port (Fa0/2) of a switch (SW2).
As can be seen, output of a command includes PoE operational mode, provided power,
type and a class of a PD connected to a port, which may all be used as metrics.
3.4.6 Observed cable length and wiring
Cisco IOS test cable-diagnostic tdr and show cable-diagnostic tdr commands
are used to perform a TDR cable test and to display its results. Example output of such
test is shown in listing 7.
SW1#test cable-diagnostics tdr interface Gi 0/2
...
SW1#show cable-diagnostics tdr interface Gi 0/2
Interface Speed Local pair Pair length Remote pair Pair status
--------- ----- ---------- ------------------ ----------- -----------
Gi0/2 1000M Pair A 8 +/- 10 meters Pair B Normal
Pair B 8 +/- 10 meters Pair A Normal
Pair C 8 +/- 10 meters Pair D Normal
Pair D 8 +/- 10 meters Pair C Normal
Listing 7: Example of cable-diagnostic command output
This output includes per cable pair information about the corresponding remote pair, pair
length and pair status. These values are used as metrics as well.
3.4.7 Error counters
As described in section 3.2.7, the original idea was to use available network card error
counters in combination with the bad traffic sent over the wire, but no cross platform and
uniform way to generate such traffic was found. Therefore, this test is not implemented.
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3.4.8 Latency and link quality
ICMP RTT and lost packets counter are shown after the corresponding ping test is over.
A shortened example of such a test is shown in listing 8.
SW1#ping 10.0.0.3 repeat 1000
Type escape sequence to abort.
Sending 1000, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 10.0.0.3, timeout is 2 seconds:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
...
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Success rate is 100 percent (1000/1000), roundp min/avg/max = 1/2/9 ms
Listing 8: Results of ping test performed from a switch (SW1) to a PC (PC).
Test output includes minimum, average and maximum RTT times as well as the amount
of requests sent and responses received. In this example 1000 packets was sent and
1000 was received, meaning that an ICMP packets lost counter equals to zero.
The test is performed over a big number of packets and an average RTT value is used as a
metric to compensate for the possible variations in response times due to an uncontrolled
network events
3.4.9 Throughput
The first idea was to use ttcp tool for throughput testing. It is truly cross platform: It is
included in Cisco IOS on switches and routers and there are binaries for Windows and
Linux system.
However, the test ttcp run on a link between switches SW1 and SW2 produced results
showed in listing 9.
ttcp-t: 67108864 bytes in 33051 ms (33.051 real seconds) (~1982 kB/s)
Listing 9: Switch (SW2) ttcp speed test results for a link between switches (SW1) and
(SW2).
Data transfer of 67108864 bytes in 33051 milliseconds corresponds to a 2030463.9 bytes
per second, or 1.95 Mb/s. Result provided by ttcp is a lot lower than the theoretical 100
Mb/s throughput of a link.
An observation was made that switch CPU load increases dramatically during the test.
Listing 10 provides CPU load statistics for a switch SW2, which was measured right after
the ttcp test finished.
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CPU utilization for five seconds: 96%/5%; one minute: 42%; five minutes
: 15%
Listing 10: CPU utilization statistic for a switch (SW2).
As can be seen, CPU load reached very high values during a test. Most likely ttcp test
results are low due to a fact that CPU cannot process bigger amounts of data and not due
to a limited link throughput.
To confirm this assumption a different speed measurement tool, called iperf, was used
to measure bandwidth of the same link. Results showed by iperf over the same link are
multitude times higher than the results provided by ttcp.
Unfortunately, iperf runs only on PCs and cannot run on a switches. Therefore, it cannot
be used to test throughput of each individual link separately. For testing purposes it is
possible to connect a separate PC to each device in the topology to perform throughput
measurements with iperf. But, it would go against initial goal of not using any additional
hardware. Therefore, throughput tests would not be performed on this topology.
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4 Results
This chapter provides results of the experiments. First, the baseline results are provided.
Next, the results of the measurements for each link under each of the attacks are provided.
In the end, the results are combined and analyzed.
4.1 Baseline
This section provides a results of the measurements in a topology without any attacks.
Later on these results would be used as a baseline for a comparison with a results received
frommeasurements when the network is under each of the attacks. For each Ethernet port
in a topology the results were extracted according to the methods described in section 3.4.
During these measurements it was found out that even though AP is running Linux, it does
not have necessary tools or log messages to check the link parameters. Therefore, link
speed and duplex metrics are not available for the AP, whereas ink state is deduced from
the fact that the AP was accessible via network, therefore it had to be up. This means
that active link tests cannot be performed on the corresponding switch port, as there are
no information about the link state on the other end of a link. These metrics are marked
as n/a in the results table 3.
TDR test on a Fa 0/2 port of SW2 stuck in 'TDR test is in progress' for half an hour. After
that port had to be turned off and on to bring a port back to the operational state. However,
it was impossible to repeat TDR test attempt until the switch was restarted.
Surprisingly, link state active test from a PC does not work as expected. When interface
is shut down on the PC, switch detects that the line protocol goes down and than back up
immediately. The same behaviour is observed for both Windows and Linux on the PC.
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The obtained results are provided in table 3.
Table 3: Results of baseline measurements.
PC SW1 SW1 SW2 SW2 AP
eth0 Gi 0/2 Gi 0/1 Fa 0/1 Fa 0/2 Main
Link
State Up Up Up Up Up Up
Speed (Mb/s) 1000 1000 100 100 100 n/a
Duplex Full Full Full Full Full n/a
PoE n/a n/a n/a PSE PSE PD
Client detected - - - No Yes -
Client class - - - - 4 -
Requested power - - - - 15.44 -
TDR n/a Wrong Stuck n/a
Pair A
Length (m) - 8 +/- 10 N/A 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - B B A - -
Status - Normal Normal Short - -
Pair B
Length (m) - 8 +/- 10 N/A 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - A A A - -
Status - Normal Normal Short - -
Pair C
Length (m) - 8 +/- 10 21 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - D D A - -
Status - Normal Short N/A - -
Pair D
Length (m) - 8 +/- 10 20 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - C C A - -
Status - Normal Short N/A - -
ICMP
RTT 1.9 2 3 4 2 2.1
Packets lost 0 0 0 0 0 0
Link - active
State Down/Up1 Match Match Match Match 2 n/a
Speed Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
Duplex Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
1 Link went down and then immediately up
2 When link is disabled, PoE goes down as well.
When testing TDR on a Fa 0/1 port of SW2, link went down for more than a minute. Dur-
ing this test PoE related log messages were generated. These messages are shown in
listing 11.
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%LINEPROTO -5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface FastEthernet0/1,
changed state to down
%LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface FastEthernet0/1, changed state to down
%ILPOWER -7-DETECT: Interface Fa0/1: Power Device detected: Cisco PD
%ILPOWER -5-POWER_GRANTED: Interface Fa0/1: Power granted
%ILPOWER -5-IEEE_DISCONNECT: Interface Fa0/1: PD removed
%ILPOWER -7-DETECT: Interface Fa0/1: Power Device detected: Cisco PD
%ILPOWER -5-IEEE_DISCONNECT: Interface Fa0/1: PD removed
%ILPOWER -7-DETECT: Interface Fa0/1: Power Device detected: Cisco PD
%ILPOWER -5-IEEE_DISCONNECT: Interface Fa0/1: PD removed
%ILPOWER -7-DETECT: Interface Fa0/1: Power Device detected: Cisco PD
%ILPOWER -5-POWER_GRANTED: Interface Fa0/1: Power granted
%ILPOWER -5-IEEE_DISCONNECT: Interface Fa0/1: PD removed
%ILPOWER -7-DETECT: Interface Fa0/1: Power Device detected: Cisco PD
%ILPOWER -5-IEEE_DISCONNECT: Interface Fa0/1: PD removed
%ILPOWER -7-DETECT: Interface Fa0/1: Power Device detected: Cisco PD
%ILPOWER -5-IEEE_DISCONNECT: Interface Fa0/1: PD removed
%ILPOWER -7-DETECT: Interface Fa0/1: Power Device detected: Cisco PD
%ILPOWER -5-IEEE_DISCONNECT: Interface Fa0/1: PD removed
%ILPOWER -7-DETECT: Interface Fa0/1: Power Device detected: Cisco PD
%ILPOWER -5-IEEE_DISCONNECT: Interface Fa0/1: PD removed
%LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface FastEthernet0/1, changed state to up
%LINEPROTO -5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface FastEthernet0/1,
changed state to up
%LINEPROTO -5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface FastEthernet0/2,
changed state to down
%LINEPROTO -5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface FastEthernet0/2,
changed state to up
Listing 11: Log messages generated while performing TDR tests on a SW1 port Fa 0/1.
After manually disabling PoE on a port, test completed successfully without PoE log mes-
sages. However, results were the same as in the first test.
Unfortunately, these TDR results do not seem reasonable or reliable in any way. These
results showed that each cable pair is connected to a remote pair A, which was not the
case, as cable was fully functioning. At the same time TDR determined incorrect cable
length for two wire pairs. Regardless of this fact, in a following measurements TDR tests
on this port are performed. But, their results are analyzed very thoroughly.
4.2 PC bridge man in the middle
Events generated on the network devices during the installation of a MitM PC are shown
in table 4. The table includes shortened log messages. Even though AP is running Linux,
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no network related events are logged on it. Therefore, this cell of a table left empty.
Table 4: Events logged on a devices during the installation.
Device Port Logged events
PC eth0 Link is down
Link is up at 1000 Mbps, full duplex
SW1 Gi 0/2 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW1 Gi 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/2 Line protocol changed state to down
PD removed
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
AP Main -
Events generated on the devices are usual log events which happen when a link goes
down and then up. These events may be used as an indicator of abnormal behaviour,
which needs to be investigated. However, it may be hard to use this indicator, depending
on the environment. It is important to know what is expected behaviour for each link in a
network before reacting to such events. For some links in a network it may be absolutely
normal to go down and up. For others it may be not.
The only odd event in these log messages is the PD removed message on SW2 Fa 0/2
without a matching Power Device detectedmessage. From this it can be concluded that
the device behind the port was replaced. This finding is confirmed by a PoE metric as
shown in table 5.
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Results of all measurements are shown in table 5.
Table 5: Results of measurements after MitM PC is installed on each of the links.
PC SW1 SW1 SW2 SW2 AP
eth0 Gi 0/2 Gi 0/1 Fa 0/1 Fa 0/2 Main
Link
State Up Up Up Up Up Down 1
Speed (mb/s) 1000 1000 1000 100 100 -
Duplex Full Full Full Full Full -
POE n/a n/a n/a PSE PSE -
Client detected - - - No No 1 -
Client class - - - - - -
Requested power - - - - - -
TDR n/a Wrong - -
Pair A
Length (m) - 0 +/- 10 24 +/- 10 N/A - -
Remote pair - B B A - -
Status - Normal Normal Normal - -
Pair B
Length (m) - 0 +/- 10 24 +/- 10 N/A - -
Remote pair - A A A - -
Status - Normal Normal Normal - -
Pair C
Length (m) - 0 +/- 10 20 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - D D A - -
Status - Normal Open N/A - -
Pair D
Length (m) - 0 +/- 10 19 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - C C A - -
Status - Normal Open N/A - -
ICMP
RTT 2.5 3 5 5 - -
Packets lost 0 0 0 0 - -
Link - active
State No changes No changes No changes No changes - -
Speed No changes No changes No changes No changes - -
Duplex No changes No changes No changes 2 No changes 2 - -
1 No PoE was provided to the AP. Attack considered unsuccessful on this link.
2 CDP duplex mismatch events were logged.
When the MitM PC was inserted in a link between SW2 Fa 0/2 and AP, no PoE was pro-
vided to the AP. Attack considered unsuccessful on this link. Therefore, no measurements
were done on the corresponding switch port.
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As one can see from table 5, Gigabit Ethernet port Gi 0/1 on a switch SW1 negotiated
a link on a 1000 Mb/s, whereas the Fa 0/1 port on the SW2, which is on the other end
of a cable does not support speeds above 100 Mb/s. This speed mismatch is a strong
indicator that the devices are not connected directly.
TDR results showed radical cable length shortage for a SW1 port Gi 0/2. On the cable
connected to this port, attack point is right next to a SW1. And TDR accurately reflected
the cable length change.
For a Gi 0/1 port of the SW1 TDR reflected pair status change for pairs C and D, and a
slight variation in a cable length. These changes together are a really strong indicator that
the device on the end of a cable was changed.
TDR test on a SW2 was performed only on a port Fa 0/1. Cable on a port Fa 0/2 was
not tested because an attack on the AP is considered unsuccessful. Unfortunately, TDR
results for SW2 Fa 0/2 port does not seem reasonable again, like it was in the baseline
measurements. The difference is that this time TDR was unable to determine a cable
length for any of the pairs.
RTT values increased slightly, however, this metric alone does not seem sufficient to
reliably indicate that there is additional device along the cable.
All active link tests showed the same results: Devices on the opposite ends were not
seeing any link parameter changes during the tests, but the links were still working. This
indicates that the devices are not connected directly.
When the link-active duplex test were performed on a cable between switches, multiple
Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) duplex mismatch error messages were generated. Ex-
ample of such message is shown in listing 12.
%CDP-4-DUPLEX_MISMATCH: duplex mismatch discovered on GigabitEthernet0
/1 (not full duplex), with SW2 FastEthernet0/1 (full duplex).
Listing 12: Example of a message generated on a SW1 during the link-active duplex test.
These CDP messages could be used as an attack indicator as well.
4.3 Switch with port mirroring
A switch used to perform this attack is a Cisco Catalyst 2960 switch, similar to SW1.
Switch configuration is shown in appendix 3.
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Events generated during the attack setup process are shown in table 6.
Table 6: Events logged on a devices during the installation.
Device Port Logged events
PC eth0 Link is down
Link is up at 1000 Mbps, full duplex
SW1 Gi 0/2 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW1 Gi 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/2 PD removed
Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
AP Main -
As can be seen, generated log messages are similar to the ones generated during the PC
MitM attack. The only difference is the order of PD removed and Line protocol changed
state to down messages on a SW2 port Fa 0/2.
Exactly as in the previous attack, no power was provided to the AP and an attack on this
link was considered unsuccessful.
Link state, speed and duplex metrics are identical to the ones observed in the previous
attack. PoE metrics are the same as well.
TDR results for the SW1 port Gi 0/1 are different. This time different wiring is detected and
all four pairs have the same status and length. TDR results for other ports are identical to
the results from the previous attack.
This time RTT values are identical to the baseline values.
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Measurements results for this attack are shown in table 7.
Table 7: Results of measurements after a switch with port mirroring is installed.
PC SW1 SW1 SW2 SW2 AP
eth0 Gi 0/2 Gi 0/1 Fa 0/1 Fa 0/2 Main
Link
State Up Up Up Up Up Down 1
Speed (mb/s) 1000 1000 1000 100 100 -
Duplex Full Full Full Full Full -
POE n/a n/a n/a PSE PSE -
Client detected - - - No No 1 -
Client class - - - - - -
Requested power - - - - - -
TDR n/a Wrong - -
Pair A
Length (m) - 0 +/- 10 24 +/- 10 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - B A A - -
Status - Normal Normal Short - -
Pair B
Length (m) - 0 +/- 10 24 +/- 10 N/A - -
Remote pair - A B A - -
Status - Normal Normal Normal - -
Pair C
Length (m) - 0 +/- 10 24 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - D C A - -
Status - Normal Normal N/A - -
Pair D
Length (m) - 0 +/- 10 24 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - C D A - -
Status - Normal Normal N/A - -
ICMP
RTT 1.9 2 3 4 - -
Packets lost 0 0 0 0 - -
Link - active
State No changes No changes No changes No changes - -
Speed No changes No changes No changes No changes - -
Duplex No changes No changes No changes No changes - -
1 No PoE was provided to the AP. Attack considered unsuccessful on this link.
Active link tests have the same results. The only difference is that CDP was not com-
plaining about the duplex of a link between switches. To investigate this behaviour, some
additional checks were performed. Apparently, CDP messages do not pass an attacker's
switch. Thus, switches have no CDP information about one another.
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4.4 Throwing Star LAN Tap
Log events generated during the installation are shown in table 8.
Table 8: Events logged on a devices during the installation.
Device Port Logged events
PC eth0 Link is down
Link is up at 100 Mbps, full duplex
SW1 Gi 0/2 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW1 Gi 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/2 Line protocol changed state to down
PD removed
Interface changed state to down
Power Device detected: IEEE PD
Power granted
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to down
Line protocol changed state to up
AP Main -
These events differ from the ones seen in the previous attacks. This time PC link come
up on a lower speed. Another difference is that the tap does not interrupt a PoE operation
and AP receives power. The same observations are confirmed in a results table 9.
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Measurements results for this attack are shown in table 9
Table 9: Results of measurements after Throwing Star LAN Tap is installed and listening
PC is connected to it.
PC SW1 SW1 SW2 SW2 AP
eth0 Gi 0/2 Gi 0/1 Fa 0/1 Fa 0/2 Main
Link
State Up Up Up Up Up Up
Speed (mb/s) 100 100 100 100 100 n/a
Duplex Full Full Full Full Full n/a
POE n/a n/a n/a PSE PSE PD
Client detected - - - No Yes -
Client class - - - - 4 -
Requested power - - - - 15.44 -
TDR n/a Wrong Stuck n/a
Pair A
Length (m) - 0 +/- 2 19 +/- 2 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - A B A - -
Status - Impedance
mismatch
Impedance
mismatch
Normal - -
Pair B
Length (m) - N/A 20 +/- 2 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - B A A - -
Status - Normal Impedance
mismatch
Short - -
Pair C
Length (m) - 0 +/- 2 21 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - C D A - -
Status - Short Short N/A - -
Pair D
Length (m) - 3 +/- 2 19 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - D C A - -
Status - Short Short N/A - -
ICMP
RTT 1.9 3 4 3 2 2.0
Packets lost 0 0 0 0 0 0
Link - active
State Down/Up1 Match Match Match Match 2 n/a
Speed Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
Duplex Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
1 Link went down and then immediately up
2 When link is disabled, PoE goes down as well.
From the first line of the table, the results differ from the ones seen in the previous attacks.
Now both SW1 Gi 0/1 and SW2 Fa 0/2 share the same speed. However, link between
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PC and SW1 Gi 0/2 degraded to a 100 Mb/s. Both of these observations are perfectly in
line with the theory behind an attack.
Another major difference is that a TDR test detected impedance mismatch on multiple
links. This is a really strong indicator that the link was tampered with. Cable wiring and
cable length changes are detected as well. Beside of that, TDR reported some short pairs,
where the normal pairs originally were. This is due to a fact that a Throwing Star LAN Tap
degrades a quality of two pairs, which are not used for the data transfer by 100BASE-TX
and 10BASE-T.
RTT values are a little bit higher than the baseline values. Unlike all the previous attacks,
all link active tests showed the same results as during the baseline measurements.
4.5 Electrically passive Ethernet tap with direct connection to the wires
Log events generated during an installation phase of this attack are shown in table 10.
Table 10: Events logged on a devices during the installation.
Device Port Logged events
PC eth0 Link is down
Link is up at 100 Mbps, full duplex
SW1 Gi 0/2 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW1 Gi 0/1 -
SW2 Fa 0/1 -
SW2 Fa 0/2 -
AP Main -
As can be seen, log messages were generated on PC and SW1, when the link was rene-
gotiated to a 100 Mb/s speed. There were no log messages generated on links which
worked at 100 Mb/s.
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Results of measurements for the topology under this attack are shown in table 11
Table 11: Results of measurements after electrically passive Ethernet tap is connected
directly to wires and a listening PC is connected to it.
PC SW1 SW1 SW2 SW2 AP
eth0 Gi 0/2 Gi 0/1 Fa 0/1 Fa 0/2 Main
Link
State Up Up Up Up Up Up
Speed (mb/s) 100 100 100 100 100 n/a
Duplex Full Full Full Full Full n/a
POE n/a n/a n/a PSE PSE PD
Client detected - - - No Yes -
Client class - - - - 4 -
Requested power - - - - 15.44 -
TDR n/a Wrong Stuck n/a
Pair A
Length (m) - 0 +/- 2 19 +/- 2 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - B B A - -
Status - Impedance
mismatch
Impedance
mismatch
Normal - -
Pair B
Length (m) - N/A 20 +/- 2 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - A A A - -
Status - Normal Impedance
mismatch
Short - -
Pair C
Length (m) - 0 +/- 2 21 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - D D A - -
Status - Short Short N/A - -
Pair D
Length (m) - 3 +/- 2 19 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - C C A - -
Status - Short Short N/A - -
ICMP
RTT 1.9 3 4 3 2 2.0
Packets lost 0 0 0 0 0 0
Link - active
State Down/Up1 Match Match Match Match 2 n/a
Speed Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
Duplex Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
1 Link went down and then immediately up
2 When link is disabled, PoE goes down as well.
The results of the measurements for this tap are generally the same as for the Throwing
Star LAN Tap. The main difference is that this tap does not change wiring and does not
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disrupt connectivity when installed on a 100BASE-TX or 10BASE-T link.
4.6 Net Optics Fast Ethernet tap
The log messages generated on devices while tap was installed are shown in table 12.
Table 12: Events logged on a devices during the installation.
Device Port Logged events
PC eth0 Link is down
Link is up at 100 Mbps, full duplex
SW1 Gi 0/2 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW1 Gi 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/2 PD removed
Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Power Device detected: IEEE PD
Power granted
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to down
Line protocol changed state to up
AP Main -
Log messages match with the messages generated during the attack with a Throwing
Star LAN Tap.
As can be seen from the log messages and from the results table 13, after installation link
between the PC and the Gi 0/2 port on SW1 degraded to a 100 Mb/s. This is expected,
as the tap used in this attack does not support speeds higher than 100BASE-TX.
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Results of measurements are shown in table 13.
Table 13: Results of measurements after Net Optics TP-CU tap is installed and listening
PC is connected to it.
PC SW1 SW1 SW2 SW2 AP
eth0 Gi 0/2 Gi 0/1 Fa 0/1 Fa 0/2 Main
Link
State Up Up Up Up Up Up
Speed (mb/s) 100 100 100 100 100 n/a
Duplex Full Full Full Full Full n/a
POE n/a n/a n/a PSE PSE PD
Client detected - - - No Yes -
Client class - - - - 4 -
Requested power - - - - 15.44 -
TDR n/a Wrong Stuck n/a
Pair A
Length (m) - N/A N/A 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - B A A - -
Status - Normal Normal Short - -
Pair B
Length (m) - N/A 21 +/- 2 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - A B A - -
Status - Normal Impedance
mismatch
Short - -
Pair C
Length (m) - 1 +/- 2 19 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - D C A - -
Status - Short Short N/A - -
Pair D
Length (m) - 0 +/- 2 19 +/- 2 N/A - -
Remote pair - C D A - -
Status - Short Short N/A - -
ICMP
RTT 1.9 2 4 4 2 2.0
Packets lost 0 0 0 0 0 0
Link - active
State Down/Up1 Match Match Match Match 2 n/a
Speed Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
Duplex Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
1 Link went down and then immediately up
2 When link is disabled, PoE goes down as well.
As expected, the results of the measurements are similar to the results observed in the at-
tacks with electrically passive tap. However, it was highly unexpected to see an impedance
mismatch with this tap. As one may think, a network device manufactured by a big vendor
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should not allow this.
4.7 Net Optics Gigabit tap
Log messages observed during the tap installation are shown in table 14.
Table 14: Events logged on a devices during the installation.
Device Port Logged events
PC eth0 Link is down
Link is up at 1000 Mbps, full duplex
SW1 Gi 0/2 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW1 Gi 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/1 Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
SW2 Fa 0/2 Line protocol changed state to down
PD removed
Interface changed state to down
Power Device detected: IEEE PD
Power granted
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to down
Interface changed state to down
Interface changed state to up
Line protocol changed state to up
AP Main -
Events shown in logs on a SW2 Fa 0/1 and SW2 Fa 0/2 differ from the usual log entries
for link going down and up. For some reason during the tap installation link on a switch
SW2 port Fa 0/1 went down and up twice.
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Unusual behaviour is also observed when performing link-active tests from a switch. As
can be seen from listing 13, the link is negotiated at 1000 Mb/s before the link-active test.
eth0: Link is up at 1000 Mbps, full duplex
Listing 13: The last log message on the PC before a link active speed test is started.
When switch port is set to 100 Mb/s, log messages from listing 14 are logged on a PC.
eth0: Link is down
eth0: Link is up at 1000 Mbps, full duplex
eth0: Link is down
eth0: Link is up at 100 Mbps, full duplex
Listing 14: Log messages generated on the PC after switch (SW1) port (Fa 0/2) speed is
changed to 100 Mb/s.
Setting a duplex to half duplex on a switch produces the output, which is shown in list-
ing 15.
eth0: Link is down
eth0: Link is up at 1000 Mbps, full duplex
eth0: Link is down
eth0: Link is up at 100 Mbps, half duplex
Listing 15: Log messages generated on the PC after switch (SW1) port (Fa 0/2) duplex is
changed to half duplex.
As can be seen, the link between the PC and the tap is first negotiated at 1000 Mb/s, full
duplex and then renegotiated to a speed supported by the SW2 Fa 0/2 port. It looks like
the tap which was used to perform this attack negotiates maximum available speed on
each end and then drops it to a higher speed supported by both ends, if needed. Such
double log messages potentially could be used to detect this or similar tap installed in a
network.
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Results of all the measurements for this attack are shown in table 15.
Table 15: Results of measurements after Net Optics TP-CU3-ZD tap is installed.
PC SW1 SW1 SW2 SW2 AP
eth0 Gi 0/2 Gi 0/1 Fa 0/1 Fa 0/2 Main
Link
State Up Up Up Up Up Up
Speed (mb/s) 1000 1000 100 100 100 n/a
Duplex Full Full Full Full Full n/a
POE n/a n/a n/a PSE PSE PD
Client detected - - - No Yes -
Client class - - - - 4 -
Requested power - - - - 15.44 -
TDR n/a Wrong Stuck n/a
Pair A
Length (m) - 4 +/- 10 N/A 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - A B A - -
Status - Normal Normal Short - -
Pair B
Length (m) - 4 +/- 10 N/A 0 +/- 2 - -
Remote pair - B A A - -
Status - Normal Normal Short - -
Pair C
Length (m) - 4 +/- 10 N/A N/A - -
Remote pair - C D A - -
Status - Normal Normal N/A - -
Pair D
Length (m) - 4 +/- 10 N/A N/A - -
Remote pair - D C A - -
Status - Normal Normal N/A - -
ICMP
RTT 1.9 2 4 3 2 2.0
Packets lost 0 0 0 0 0 0
Link - active
State Down/Up1 Match Match Match Match 2 n/a
Speed Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
Duplex Match Match Match Match n/a n/a
1 Link went down and then immediately up
2 When link is disabled, PoE goes down as well.
Besides the odd log messages, TDR is the only metric which detected this attack.
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4.8 Combined results
Returning back to the goals stated in the introduction, this project aims to answer following
research questions:
1. Is it possible to reliably detect all known physical layer attacks in Ethernet networks
by observing information available to the network devices?
2. Is there a single metric which could be used to detect each physical layer attack in
Ethernet networks?
Results of experiments which are provided in sections 4.1 to 4.7 can be used to answer the
first research question. To answer the second research question, table 16 is constructed.
Table 16: Effectiveness of metrics based on the attack type.
PC
MitM
Switch
with port
mirror-
ing
Throwing
Star
LAN
Tap
Electrically
passive
tap
Fast
Eth-
ernet
tap
Gigabit
tap
Link
State Partial Partial None None None None
Speed Partial Partial Partial Partial Partial None
Duplex None None None None None None
POE
Client detected Partial Partial None None None None
Client class Partial Partial None None None None
Requested power Partial Partial None None None None
TDR
Length Full Full Full Full Full Full
Remote pair None Partial Partial None Partial Partial
Status Partial Partial Full Full Full Partial
ICMP
RTT None None None None None None
Packets lost None None None None None None
Link - active
State Full Full None None None None
Speed Full Full None None None None
Duplex Full Full None None None None
Log events Full Full Full Partial Full Full
Table 16 groups together experiment results and shows how effective each metric is in
detecting each of the selected attacks. Effectiveness of a metric is marked as full, partial
or none, where full corresponds to a metric, which detected an attack on all links in a
topology, partial corresponds to a metric which detected an attack on at least one link and
none corresponds to a metric which did not detected an attack.
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TDRmetrics results for each pair aremerged in one. In this way, if at least one pair showed
a value which differs from the baseline value, combined metric is considered different from
the baseline value. TDR results for SW2 switch are excluded, as they are not reliable.
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5 Discussion
The main benefit of the approach covered in this project is that it allows to detect physical
layer attacks on Ethernet networks without having to purchase any additional equipment.
It makes this approach highly scalable. However, there are some drawbacks connected
to it. The biggest drawback is that multiple tests used in this project are disruptive. During
these tests link downtime varies from a couple of a second break for a link parameters
renegotiation up to an undefined amount of time due to a complete test failure where the
device has to be restarted. Some tests cause a device power loss, which leads to a device
shutting down, and this may cause a data loss. These facts may be sufficient for some
not to implement such tests in their environment.
A couple of the proposed metrics were not tested due to limitations posed by network
devices selected for testing. It is possible that these metrics may be successfully used on
the other models of network equipment.
As shown in table 16 some of the metrics show no effectiveness at all. These metrics are
link duplex, ICMP RTT and packet lost counter. The fact that these metrics did not react
to any of the attacks does not mean that they are useless for attack detection. They may
react to attacks in different conditions. For example, link duplex degrades to a half duplex
if a hub is used for attack. ICMP RTT and packet lost counter may react to an attack with
a device which is not able to hold the load, such as a slow PC acting as a bridge.
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6 Conclusions
The goal of this project was to determine if it is possible to reliably detect known physi-
cal layer attacks on Ethernet networks using only common network equipment, such as
switches and PCs. Results covered in chapter 4 show that it is possible to detect all tested
attacks in the example topology using selected metrics.
Themost efficient method for detecting physical layer attacks happened to be time domain
reflectometry, which is, unfortunately, not widely supported by various network equipment.
According to the test results, the second most efficient method of detecting such attacks
is to monitor log events. Luckily, almost every device can be configured to generate logs,
which then can be aggregated and analyzed. The problem is that, in order to efficiently
use log events for attacks detection, it is important to know which log events are normal
for a given network and which are not.
During the tests some network equipment demonstrated highly unexpected behaviour and
some equipment provided unreliable test results. The most important conclusion that can
be made is that it is important to know the network and network equipment really well to
be able to implement attack detection efficiently.
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1 Detailed information about the SW1
Cisco IOS Software , C2960 Software (C2960-LANBASEK9 -M), Version 15.0(2)
SE8, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright (c) 1986-2015 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Thu 14-May-15 02:39 by prod_rel_team
ROM: Bootstrap program is C2960 boot loader
BOOTLDR: C2960 Boot Loader (C2960-HBOOT-M) Version 12.2(44)SE5, RELEASE
SOFTWARE (fc1)
SW1 uptime is 2 minutes
System returned to ROM by power-on
System image file is "flash:c2960-lanbasek9 -mz.150-2.SE8.bin"
This product contains cryptographic features and is subject to United
States and local country laws governing import, export, transfer and
use. Delivery of Cisco cryptographic products does not imply
third-party authority to import, export, distribute or use encryption.
Importers , exporters , distributors and users are responsible for
compliance with U.S. and local country laws. By using this product you
agree to comply with applicable laws and regulations. If you are unable
to comply with U.S. and local laws, return this product immediately.
A summary of U.S. laws governing Cisco cryptographic products may be
found at:
http://www.cisco.com/wwl/export/crypto/tool/stqrg.html
If you require further assistance please contact us by sending email to
export@cisco.com.
cisco WS-C2960 -24TT-L (PowerPC405) processor (revision C0) with 65536K
bytes of memory.
Processor board ID FOC1121ZEVZ
Last reset from power-on
1 Virtual Ethernet interface
24 FastEthernet interfaces
2 Gigabit Ethernet interfaces
The password -recovery mechanism is enabled.
64K bytes of flash-simulated non-volatile configuration memory.
Base ethernet MAC Address : 00:1C:57:6B:F5:00
Motherboard assembly number : 73-10390-03
Power supply part number : 341-0097-02
Motherboard serial number : FOC112131ZQ
Power supply serial number : AZS111704SS
Model revision number : C0
Motherboard revision number : C0
Model number : WS-C2960 -24TT-L
System serial number : FOC1121ZEVZ
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Top Assembly Part Number : 800-27221-02
Top Assembly Revision Number : D0
Version ID : V02
CLEI Code Number : COM3L00BRA
Hardware Board Revision Number : 0x01
Switch Ports Model SW Version SW Image
------ ----- ----- ---------- ----------
* 1 26 WS-C2960 -24TT-L 15.0(2)SE8 C2960-LANBASEK9 -M
Configuration register is 0xF
Listing 16: 'show version' command output for a SW1.
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2 Detailed information about the SW2
Cisco IOS Software , C3560 Software (C3560-IPSERVICESK9 -M), Version
15.0(2)SE8, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright (c) 1986-2015 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Wed 13-May-15 23:32 by prod_rel_team
ROM: Bootstrap program is C3560 boot loader
BOOTLDR: C3560 Boot Loader (C3560-HBOOT-M) Version 12.2(50r)SE, RELEASE
SOFTWARE (fc1)
Switch uptime is 1 minute
System returned to ROM by power-on
System image file is "flash:c3560-ipservicesk9 -mz.150-2.SE8.bin"
This product contains cryptographic features and is subject to United
States and local country laws governing import, export, transfer and
use. Delivery of Cisco cryptographic products does not imply
third-party authority to import, export, distribute or use encryption.
Importers , exporters , distributors and users are responsible for
compliance with U.S. and local country laws. By using this product you
agree to comply with applicable laws and regulations. If you are unable
to comply with U.S. and local laws, return this product immediately.
A summary of U.S. laws governing Cisco cryptographic products may be
found at:
http://www.cisco.com/wwl/export/crypto/tool/stqrg.html
If you require further assistance please contact us by sending email to
export@cisco.com.
cisco WS-C3560V2 -24PS (PowerPC405) processor (revision G0) with 131072K
bytes of memory.
Processor board ID FDO1433X0AU
Last reset from power-on
1 Virtual Ethernet interface
24 FastEthernet interfaces
2 Gigabit Ethernet interfaces
The password -recovery mechanism is enabled.
512K bytes of flash-simulated non-volatile configuration memory.
Base ethernet MAC Address : 68:BD:AB:20:58:00
Motherboard assembly number : 73-11706-12
Power supply part number : 341-0266-02
Motherboard serial number : FDO14330HHM
Power supply serial number : LIT14291K0L
Model revision number : G0
Motherboard revision number : A0
Model number : WS-C3560V2 -24PS-E
System serial number : FDO1433X0AU
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Top Assembly Part Number : 800-32964-04
Top Assembly Revision Number : A0
Version ID : V04
CLEI Code Number : COMKV00DRA
Hardware Board Revision Number : 0x03
Switch Ports Model SW Version SW Image
------ ----- ----- ---------- ----------
* 1 26 WS-C3560V2 -24PS 15.0(2)SE8 C3560-
IPSERVICESK9 -M
Configuration register is 0xF
Listing 17: 'show version' command output for a SW2.
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3 Configuration of the switch with port mirrorring
Following is the configuration, which was used for the switch during the attack.
SW-Mirror#sh run
Building configuration...
Current configuration : 2466 bytes
!
! Last configuration change at 00:26:45 UTC Mon Mar 1 1993
!
version 15.0
no service pad
service timestamps debug datetime msec
service timestamps log datetime msec
no service password -encryption
!
hostname SW-Mirror
!
boot-start-marker
boot-end-marker
!
!
no aaa new-model
system mtu routing 1500
!
!
no ip domain-lookup
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
spanning -tree mode pvst
spanning -tree extend system-id
no spanning -tree vlan 1
!
vlan internal allocation policy ascending
!
!
!
!
!
!
interface FastEthernet0/1
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
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interface FastEthernet0/2
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/3
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/4
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/5
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/6
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/7
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/8
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/9
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/10
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/11
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/12
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/13
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/14
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/15
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/16
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switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/17
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/18
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/19
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/20
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/21
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/22
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/23
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface FastEthernet0/24
switchport mode access
no keepalive
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/1
switchport mode access
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/2
switchport mode access
!
interface Vlan1
no ip address
shutdown
!
ip http server
ip http secure-server
no cdp run
!
!
line con 0
exec-timeout 0 0
logging synchronous
line vty 0 4
login
line vty 5 15
login
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!
!
monitor session 1 source interface Gi0/1
monitor session 1 destination interface Fa0/1
end
Listing 18: Configuration of a switch used during the attack.
